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A Program Commiltce Biotcchnnlngy was cstnhlished in 
the Netherlands for the period lYXl-LYXS. lo stimulate hio- 
technological research and ita contribution IO innovation. Ef- 
fcctr of its activities on rcscarchers and on the rczcarch system 
have hccn mcnwrcd in terms of recognition of and commil- 
mcnt to the priorities and approaches of the Program Comnrit- 
tee. Rcxulta from the qucstionnrrire survey and ths inlr~icws 
arc prcscntcd. and are uwd to a~css the implementation 
strategy of the commitrce and the dynamics of oricnt;ltion of 
rcwarchcrs to new priorities. A consciously orchc!,trating 
srratcgy. with some accommodation to the interests of the 
field. appears IO hc productive. This may hc a generally useful 
middle courx between dirigism and laisscr-faire. because it 
exploit.\ the leverage that rcsidcs in the stratcgics of scicntisrs 
to mohilizc resources for their work. 
1. Introduction 
Actual experience with implementation of sci- 
ence policy priorities, as well as insights from 
implementation studies in general, have led to a 
better understanding of the possibilities and limi- 
tations of implementing science policy priorities. 
Only rarely, however, has assessment of the effects 
of such implementation been undertaken. Most 
often. policy analysts as well as practitioners of 
science policy have been content to build on their 
own estimates of the success of the implementa- 
tion when evaluating past experience and de- 
signing new implementation activities. This is one 
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reason to present the results of our recent evalua- 
tion study of the effects of stimulating biotechnol- 
ogy-relevant research in the Netherlands [ 191. Also, 
we think that the findings themselves will shed 
some light on the interactions and processes oc- 
curring during implcmcntation of science policy 
priorities. 
Strategies of implementation can be usefully 
located on a continuum, with synoptic policy mak- 
ing with top-down implementation at one ex- 
treme, and purely reactive science policy (e.g. 
guided by proposal pressure) at the other. The 
former option may look attractive on paper, but is 
seldom realistic. The American Cancer Program 
has been set up this way, and analytical tools have 
been developed for top-down implementation in 
the work of German science scholars in Starnberg 
and Bielefeld ([S], [20], see also [IS] for a brief 
evaluation). Even there, scientists and scientific 
institutions are heavily involved in articulating 
priorities and specifying implementation activities, 
transforming the program in the meantime to a 
shape more in accord with their interests. 
Reactive science policy, on the other hand, is 
characterized by a generalized largesse towards 
science, which may have been acceptable in the 
“golden age” of science policy, the decade be- 
tween 1957 and 1967, but is not suited to the 
climate of selectivity and accountability of the 
1980s. As a strategy of implementation, a reactive 
science policy has to assume that science is a 
reservoir containing a wide variety of potential 
projects that will materialize as soon as priorities 
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are set and funds are made available. Thus. it 
neglects existing social-institutional. as well as 
cognitive structures. which will limit and trans- 
form the realization of the priority. 
Present practices of implementing science policy 
priorities try to run some middle course between 
the two extremes. Only when an overwhelming 
sense of urgency is shared among policy makers 
and researchers can science policy proceed by 
defining a mission and creating an organization 
for this task. In other cases commitment of scien- 
tists and their institutions has to be won. which 
often requires adaptations from policy makers to 
existing cognitive and institutional interests. In 
Europe even more than in the United States. 
realistic goals are often limited to shifting ongoing 
research in preferred directions. 
In 1979, when biotechnological research was 
declared a science policy priority in the Ncther- 
lands by the Ministers of Science Policy and of 
Economic Affairs, they approached the implemen- 
tation of the priority in the by then usual Dutch 
style: establish a Program Committee in which 
prominent scientists (and in many casts also in- 
dustrialists with a scientific background) are ap- 
pointed to prepare and to implement a science 
policy program. Thus, execution of policy is dc- 
legatcd to representatives of the field in question. 
However, members are generally selected for their 
identification with the mission (in this case to 
stimulate biotechnological research in the Nrther- 
lands with a view to creating an infrastructure for 
innovations). Program Committees therefore have 
a dual role. All this applied to the Program Com- 
mittee Biotechnology (PCB), and it played both 
roles effectively by championing biotechnological 
research with the Ministries (e.g., by negotiating 
for larger budgets), and by orchestrating the im- 
plementation of external priorities (e.g., of big 
industrial corporations in the Netherlands) with 
the scientists. 
A Program Committee faces a number of prob- 
lems: it (usually) has to address a broad and 
heterogeneous area of research, and has to mobi- 
lize not only scientists for the specific priorities, 
but also existing institutions and funding agencies, 
each with their own stake in the field. In the case 
of biotechnology, the multi-actor character of the 
implementation situation has been especially pro- 
nounced because of the “shining future” of bio- 
technology (to quote a conference title), which 
attracts many actors lo the area. This facilitates 
one task of the Program Committee. raising inter- 
est for the general priority, but makes it more 
difficult to get commitment to the specific pro- 
gram it develops. 
The Program Committee Biotechnology has 
been conscious of these problems, and taken an 
activist approach in addressing them. For the same 
reason. it welcomed the opportunity. provided by 
the Office of Science Policy of the Ministry of 
Education and Sciences. to have three evaluation 
studies done: of the impact on scientific research, 
of the industrial situation. and of societal impacts 
of biotechnology. The results of the first of these 
studies will be reported here; a detailed version is 
available in Dutch [19]. A general impression of 
the program and of Dutch biotechnology activities 
can be found in the symposium report [ 111. 
Many of the details of the implementation of 
the priority and its effects are. of course, specific 
to the Dutch situation and to Dutch biotechno- 
logical research. The issues of commitment of 
scientists to science policy program goals. and of 
entrenchment of priorities in the research system 
arc of more general interest, and will be the focus 
of this article. For the same reason, WC shall pay 
some attsntion to the methodological problems of 
measuring commitment and entrenchment. 
2. The Biotechnology Program and the rneasurc- 
nicnt of its effects 
To avoid misunderstandings, we note at the 
outset that the definition of biotechnology (never 
a simple matter), tends to differ between Europe 
and the USA. Whiie American usage emphasizes 
the applications of “new”, often molecular bi- 
ology, Europeans accord more weight to the tech- 
nological or engineering aspects: 
Biotechnology is the application of scientific 
and engineering principles to the processing 
of materials by biological agents to provide 
goods and services. [3] 
Furthermore, the biological agents are often 
limited to micro-organisms, cell cultures and en- 
zymes. The Dutch Program Committee follows the 
definition that has also been adopted by the 
European Federation of Biotechnology, and which 
specifies the relevant scientific and technological 
disciplines: 
Biotechnology is the integrated use of bio- 
chemistry. molecular genetics, microbiology 
and process technology in order to achieve 
practical applications of the capabilities of 
micro-organisms. cell cultures, or parts of 
micro-organisms or cells. [ 131 
The emphasis on the integrated use of biologi- 
cal and technological disciplines is related to a 
concern. very marked around 1980, about the gap 
between the two clusters of disciplines. The Pro- 
gram Committee Biotechnology started out, in 
fact. with the aim of bridging this gap, and re- 
quired both components in projects to be funded 
from their budget. When it turned out that an 
important segment of biological research would 
then fall outside their scope, the requirement was 
relaxed. 
The general concern to contribute to biotechno- 
logical innovation - the chairman of the Program 
Committee, in more exuberant moments, talked of 
the Netherlands becoming “the biotechnology 
delta of Europe” - was reflected in the way the 
Program Committee went about its task of articu- 
lating and implementing the priority. Three types 
of research were distinguished according to their 
position in an “innovation trajectory”, and for 
each of them, specific measures were developed. 
(1) Fundamental research relevant to biotech- 
nology would be stimulated through the existing 
research council system, initially by having sup- 
plementary funding (30 percent of project costs 
would be financed through the biotechnology pro- 
gram), while in time, the full costs would have to 
be borne by the research councils themselves. A 
special committee, the Evaluation Committee Bio- 
technology, was created within the central organi- 
zation of the research councils to judge proposals 
submitted for supplementary funding. 
(2) Application-oriented research, which fits less 
easily into disciplinary organizations, was to be 
stimulated by the establishment of so-called “Mul- 
fidisciphnnire dwrrrsoerbunden” (multi-disciplinary 
transverse organizational structures): within a uni- 
versity (sometimes two collaborating universities), 
different departments should participate in a col- 
laborative venture in biotechnological research, 
with its own charter and with special support and 
protection from the central university board(s). 
Supplementary support from the Program Com- 
mittee (up to 30%). and the prospect of attracting 
outside money in general. would be the incentives 
for the universities. 
(3) Applied research would be stimulated with 
the help of the new instrument of “Integral Ap- 
plied Projects”. collaborative ventures between a 
university and an industry (sometimes with 
government research institutes as a third partner). 
with the university research receiving additional 
support from the biotechnology program. An 
example (and the first such project, concluded in 
1983) is the contract between Duphar and the 
University of Utrecht to develop vaccines against 
animal viruses with the help of recombinant-DNA 
technology. 
During the regular program (1983-1988). the 
annual budget of about 12 million Dutch guilders 
would be distributed over these three categories in 
the ratio 1 : 3: 4; the ratios reflect the increasing 
costs going from fundamental to applied research. 
In the first two years. the Program Committee was 
also able to allocate funds, although the program 
had not yet been formulated (until April 1982) or 
approved (until May 1983). A special budget had 
been allocated, out of which projects from cate- 
gories (I) and (2) were co-financed. (Such a procc- 
durc has become quite common with Dutch sci- 
ence policy program committees: implementation 
starts before the program is fully articulated.) 
Further details of the Dutch science policy 
scene and the activities of the Program Committee 
Biotechnology will be provided when necessary 
for the understanding of the evaluation of the 
effects of implementation. Our approach to the 
evaluation of effects on scientific research is based 
on a distinction between three levels at which a 
shift to biotechnological research and to the prior- 
ities of the Program Committee might occur: the 
micro-level of research decisions of individuals 
and research groups; the meso-level of research 
institutions. funding agencies and policy bodies, 
all with their own aims and vested interests; and 
the macro-level of overall trends (in science, as 
well as in the innovation race among industries 
and national states). 
At the micro-level, it is the commitment of 
scientists to do research in biotechnology, and 
especially in the designated priority areas, that 
should be checked as the most important effect of 
implementation. To this end. a postal question- 
naire was prepared and sent out in the fall of 
1984, according to the Dillman-Nederhof method 
[6], [12], to a random sample of 336 biotechnologi- 
cal researchers. The net response was 76 percent 
(226 usable questionnaires). and this is estimated 
to form a 40 percent sample of the population of 
biotechnology relevant researchers in the Nether- 
lands. The population consists of the members of 
the Dutch Biotechnological Association (380). cor- 
rected for non-biotechnologist members and for 
members working abroad, combined with the 
names of researchers in an inventory of current 
biotechnological research in the Netherlands [4]. 
Surprisingly, also for the Program Committee, 
which had taken the Dutch Biotechnological As- 
sociation to be its primary target group, only 24 
percent of the members of the Association ap- 
pcared in the inventory. A possible explanation is 
the dominant technological and industrial-micro- 
biological orientation of the Association. and the 
increasing relevance to biotechnology of much 
larger segments of the life sciences. 
The questionnaire contained 69 (sometimes 
composite) questions, which asked for information 
about ongoing research, relations with industry, 
about knowledge and opinions on the Program 
Committee, perceptions of developments in bio- 
trchnology. and intentions for research in the near 
future and the importance of different considcra- 
(ions in such decisions. These last questions were 
based on the (modified) Fishbein-Ajzen model of 
intentional action [I], [7]. a model which has been 
applied with success in other sectors, but never 
before to research decisions. One reason to intro- 
duce such a model was the timing of the evalua- 
tion study: half a year before the end of the term 
of office of the Program Committee. It would be 
important to know about the intentions for re- 
search by the end of 1985/beginning of 1986. in 
order to obtain the full picture of the effects of the 
committee’s activities. Another reason was that 
such a model allows a better insight in the dy- 
namics of research decisions, e.g.. whether atti- 
tudes toward fundamental or applied research are 
a dominant factor, or rather the work context and 
the views of team leaders and the institutional 
environment in general. 
At the meso-level, the question is to what ex- 
tent existing bodies and groups accommodate 
themselves to the new priority, and how far this 
priority becomes entrenched in the research sys- 
tem. Interviews with spokespeople from these bod- 
ies and groups, and analysis of documents, were 
sources of information. Again, a specific theoreti- 
cal perspective was chosen: interorganizational 
linkages may be established because of new re- 
source dependencies (funds. legitimation derived 
from following “official” priorities), and the net- 
work of linkages may become stabilized, so that it 
continues to exist and constrain (and enable) the 
different actors. also after the original incentives 
have disappeared. Such networks have been called 
“implementation structures” (91. and have been 
used to analyse energy research programs in 
Sweden [21]. In the latter study. the point was that 
earlier “implementation structures” (in this case, 
for nuclear energy research) would be an obstacle 
to the creation of new “implementation struc- 
tures”. Another aspect of the dynamics of imple- 
mentation at the meso-level is that the “corporate 
actors” [IO. p. 4571 will introduce their own goals 
and intcrcsts into the “implementation structure”, 
so that entrenchment may well entail a shift of 
goals from the original priority to one more suited 
to the corporate actors. In the case of biotechnol- 
ogy, the fact that more fundamental biological 
rcscarch has to bc allowed into the program may 
bc seen as the price to bc paid to get the relevant 
corporate actors (e.g., some university depart- 
mrnts and research councils) involved at all. 
The macro-level cannot. in general, be manipu- 
lated by a program committee, so there is little use 
in checking for effects at this level. It is important, 
however, for the question of causality. In our case, 
it is a continuing problem in determining whether 
certain developments are a consequence of activi- 
ties of the Program Committee Biotechnology, or 
of general trends, independently of the Commit- 
tee. If one only wants to check whether certain 
effects obtain (e.g. more technology in biological 
research), it does not matter what the cause is. 
Lessons to be learned from the implementation, 
however, can only be drawn if there is a link 
between the activity and the effects. 
One example of the difficulty of attributing 
causality is the increase in interdisciplinarity. 
According to the questionnaire data. there is in- 
creasing interaction between process technology, 
on the one hand, and molecular genetics, on the 
other hand. with the existing and substantial 
“ bio-base” of microbiological and biochemical 
work (over the period 1981-1984). The fastest 
growing field is bioprocess engineering. This is 
exactly the trend visible in a core journal of bio- 
technology. Biotechnologv and Bioengineering. over 
the period 1970-1979. (161 By the end of that 
decade, Dutch biotechnological research was pub- 
lished quite frequently in this journal. The intema- 
lional trend may therefore have influenced the 
interest in bioprocess engineering more than the 
objective of the Program Committee to have more 
interaction between biology and technology. 
3. Findings at the micro-level of researchers 
The Program Committee Biotechnology has 
been able to distribute money to researchers: the 
real question. naturally, is how far researchers 
have become committed lo doing biotechnology- 
relevant research (in general) and research in pri- 
ority arcas in particular. Besides asking re- 
searchers in our sample directly about their inten- 
tions for 1985/1986. we also collected data on the 
dynamics of such decisions and on trends in the 
field. 
The Program Committee had designated as pri- 
oritics four arcas of basic research (covering the 
disciplines mentioned in the definition of biotech- 
nology) and four themes in application-oriented 
research (host-vector systems; somatic cell-hy- 
bridization; second-generation biological reactors 
and processes: product recovery). The distribution 
of intentions to do research within or outside 
these priority areas is shown in fig. 1. 
In application-oriented research, the universi- 
ties show no clear preference for the priority 
themes: 43 percent of the university scientists in 
(Highly) Ncutrd (Highly) 
probable improbable 
lnlcnlion lo do applicalion- 
oricnIcd rexarch within 
priorily arcas 52% 11% 37% 
I&WI. outside priority arcas 3X% 14% 4X% 
IntcnIion IO do fundamental 
rcscarch within priority 
arcas 67% 1% 26% 
I&WI, outside priority arcas 14% 7% 19% 
Fig. 1. InIcnIions of rcscarchcrs IO do rcscarch within or 
outside program priority ZWCZLS by law 19HS/early 19X6. 
the sample thought it (highly) probable that they 
would work on such themes. while 35 percent 
intended to work (instead or in addition) on appli- 
cation-oriented research outside the themes. In 
industry and in government laboratories the per- 
centages of those intending to work on the priority 
themes are much higher: 70 and 62 percent respec- 
tively. Since the Program Committee had defined 
these themes with a view lo their relevance lo 
ongoing applied research, there may be a conver- 
gence of interest. 
If it is acceptable that universities shift their 
research further in the direction of applications 
(an issue to which we will return below). these 
findings imply that commitment to the program 
priorities might be increased further. Biological 
researchers especially (a short-hand term indicat- 
ing biochemists, molecular biologists. geneticists, 
microbiologists. immunologisls, and other life sci- 
entists) would be a target group. The difference 
from technological researchers (biotechnologists, 
chemical technologists and other technologists and 
engineering scientists) is striking: the latter group 
(N = 39) intends to work on the application-ori- 
ented priority themes already (81%). the former 
(N = 126) only for 47 percent. Intention to do 
basic research in the priority .areas is high for 
biological researchers (76%) - almost all funda- 
mental research done by biological scientists in 
our population would fall under that designation 
- and appreciably lower for technologists (57%), 
which is to be explained by Ihe orientation to- 
wards application of technologists. 
The differences between “biologists” and 
“ technologists” deserve further discussion. The 
gap between the two clusters of disciplines, re- 
flected in the differences in research style, in 
organizaGonal forms and in disciplinary culture 
and attitudes, was considered lo be a major stum- 
bling block for the growth of biotechnology around 
1980. On this account, the increasing collabora- 
lion between disciplines, including working in 
teams with both technologists and biologists. and 
the increasing interaction between the several sci- 
entific societies, is one of the successes of the 
Biotechnology Program. Questionnaire and inter- 
view data show that the change between 1980 and 
1984 primarily consists in the mobilization of bi- 
ologists towards technological issues and applica- 
tion, many of them in disciplines or institutions 
where such work was not common, and now ad- 
ding to the small core of industrial and environ- 
mental microbiologists and applied biochemists. 
The age distribution of the biologists in our sam- 
ple has a broad top for 40-44 years. showing that 
the shifts were made by researchers already estab- 
lished in their disciplines. (This contrasts with the 
technologists, where a bi-modal age distribution 
was found: the old vanguard group promoting 
biotechnology already in the early 1970s and now 
nearing 50 years of age. and the second generation 
trained by them.) The shift also appeared in the 
response to questions on ideas about application 
and on contacts with industry. Biologists (circa 
1981) used to have fewer ideas about application 
than technologists, and although they now (1984) 
rate almost equal, the follow-up of such ideas is 
still much less. Contacts with industry are less 
intensive: 30 percent biologists, compared with 68 
percent technologists, do appreciable amounts of 
contract research (for consultancy, the difference 
is less striking). Some further data (e.g. on con- 
tacts with industry abroad) suggests a split within 
the group of biologists: about half being active in 
application-oriented relations, while the other half 
is not so involved, and limits itself to doing bio- 
logical research that now turns out to have rcle- 
Vance for application. 
Because the central program goal of the Com- 
mittee was to stimulate more application-oriented 
research (and applied research, but this falls out- 
side the scope of our study, also because this part 
of the program was implemented only at the end 
of the program period), further understanding of 
the dynamics of research decisions in this direc- 
tion was sought by checking the variables that 
according to the Fishbein-Ajzen model of inten- 
tional action ([I ), (7)) can influence the intentions 
to do research of a certain type by 1985/1986. 
The two major determinants of the intention to do 
application-oriented research were the reference 
environment of the researcher (primarily team 
leader, research director and director(s) of the 
institute) and earlier experience with application- 
oriented research. There was no dependence on 
attitudes toward such research, as one might have 
thought, nor on considerations like the wish to do 
challenging research, investments made in current 
research. and financial advantages, that could in 
principle influence intentions [ 131. For intentions 
to do fundamental research. the same dominance 
of reference environment was found, with in ad- 
dition some dependence on the attitude toward 
fundamental research. (Experience with funda- 
mental research did not appear as a determinant, 
probably because almost all researchers would 
have had such experience during their training.) 
These results imply an important finding for the 
dynamics of research decisions: attitudes are much 
less important than reference environments in de- 
termining choices for fundamental and for appli- 
cation-oriented research. This may be related to 
the “collectivized” character of modern research 
[22]; it has also implications for the way policy 
priorities can be implemented. We shall come 
back to this point in section 5. 
A different way to make a possibly growing 
commitment to biotechnological research visible is 
to ask researchers about the extent of the biotech- 
nological component in their work and about the 
importance they attached to it. On the average, 
the biotechnological component in the research of 
respondents has doubled in size between I981 and 
late 1984, and is expected to increase further by 
1985/1986. Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
diffcrcnt sizes of the biotechnological component 
in the sample. It is striking how the major shift is 
between little or no biotcchnological component 
to an appreciable amount of biotechnology. 
(Ketrospcctive distortion might occur, but tends to 
work in the opposite direction [SJ.) The hard core 
of researchers fully committed to biotechnology 
grows only slowly. 
The picture that emerges fits with the earlier 
discussion of biologists shifting to biotechnology- 
relevant research. It also raises the issue of 
“band-wagon” effects: is biotechnology the new 
fashion, and are researchers relabeling ongoing 
research in order to share in the windfall? Such a 
relabeling may also distort the data presented 
here, as they are based on estimates from the 
scientists themselves; it is known, however, that 
mail surveys are much less an occasion for relabel- 
ing than presentations before audiences (including 
interviews). Apart from being a methodological 
problem in our study, relabeling is a continuing 
concern for science policy makers, who are afraid 
that their attempts are being undermined by such 
strategic behaviour of scientists. Therefore, we 
attempted to check for the extent of the phenome- 
non. First, we asked if respondents thought re- 
labeling was widely spread, and then if they were 
involved in relabeling themselves. The phenome- 
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non was considcrcd to be widespread (this was 
confirmrd in the interviews), the own involvement 
in rclabcling depcndcd on how csscntial the bio- 
technological component was in the respondrnt’s 
situation. If essential. littlc rclabcling was re- 
ported. If less so (and this coincides with biotech- 
nological components below 50 percent), there 
turn out to be two different groups: one exag- 
gcrates. the other is hesitant to attach the label 
‘biotechnology’ and may well underestimate the 
extent of the biotechnological component. 
Such a finding can be explained if relabeling 
occurs as sketched in fig. 3 (which introduces the 
unknown “real” biotechnological component!). It 
will be a function of both the actual extent of the 
biotechnological component, and of the strategy 
chosen by the scientist (up-labeling or down-label- 
ing. one could say). 
Two comments are in order. First, relabeling 
cannot be overcome, in spite of the justified con- 
cerns of policy makers. Screening of project pro- 
posals by knowledgeable reviewers certainly helps. 
Some of our interviewees held that, after a first 
wave of relabeling, screening, and especially the 
prospect of knowledgeable screening, had been 
sufficient to limit relabeling to relatively innocent 
majorizing of claims. In fact, scientific research 
can be relevant to a number of goals at the same 
time, and producing different labels for different 
audiences is part of a risk-spreading strategy [ 171. 
A concrete example is provided by a project on 
microbial desulphurization of coal in the Techni- 
cal University of Delft. It had been part of an 
earlier National Program to stimulate coal rc- 
search, and was subsequently submitted (and 
accepted) for the biotechnology program. Further- 
more, a label that has been attached to research 
for opportunistic reasons will still have some ef- 
fects: some effort is made to retain credibility, 
while resources mobilized under the new label will 
also orient the research in the new direction. Indi- 
cations of such processes happening could be 
found; however, it often takes a number of years 
before the effects of the new label become irre- 
versible. 
The policy implication of this analysis is that 
policy makers and implementators should not, 
after weeding out the worst cases, try to make 
screening ever more effective in reducing the 
amount of relabeling, but take the researchers up 
on their own labels, for instance by requiring 
accountability, and over a sufficiently long period 
of time. In the case of biotechnology in the 
Netherlands, four years appears to be enough in a 
few favourable situations. but another two years 
at least seems to be necessary to create stable 
260 
extent of relabeling 
relabeled 
real component 
I 
08 100% 
real biotechnological component 
commitments in general. More difficult to handle 
is the second comment: if our explanation of the 
findings (fig. 3) is valid, it implies that policy 
makers should also be concerned about researchers 
not recognizing the relevance of their work to the 
priorities (or not wanting to label it so). Unncces- 
sary “down-labeling” can reduce the effectivity of 
implementation and is harder to spot and countcr- 
act than “up-labeling”. 
Commitment to the biotechnology program can 
also consist in knowledge of and identification 
with the program in general. independent of the 
details of one’s own research. Forty-five percent of 
the respondents had good or very good knowl- 
edge. according to a knowledge scale constructed 
with the help of six questionnaire items. There is 
great overlap between this group and the 78 re- 
spondents with a biotechnological component of 
60 percent or more in their research in 1984. This 
latter group contains practically all of the 41 
respondents who say they feel quite involved with 
the program. Thus, there is a core group of heavily 
involved researchers. For such a group. the Pro- 
gram Committee is a more real presence than for 
more peripheral researchers. and they will be in- 
fluenced more easily by the Committee (although 
not necessarily be more in agreement with it. as 
some examples show). Respondents from the core 
group rated the influence of the Committee in 
bringing about changes in the policy of the rc- 
spondent’s institution more highly: also, there is a 
correlation with frequent utilization of ideas about 
application. 
The existence of a core group of involved and 
active researchers is important for the implcmen- 
tation of policy priorities, because they are, in 
general. senior researchers and have a say in their 
own groups and institutions. Creating such a group 
and maintaining its identification with the policy 
program may well count as a major objective for 
effective implementation, while the more visible 
allocation of funds is a means toward such a goal. 
An impression of the size of the different groups 
can be obtained by turning sample data into 
population data. The sample amounted to 40 per- 
cent of a population of members of the Dutch 
Biotachnological Association (an indicator of 
identification with biotechnology) and senior re- 
searchers in the 1983 inventory of Dutch biotech- 
nological research (an indicator of involvement). 
The core group of our sample translates into the 
csntre group, while the remainder will be periph- 
ery, but still close to the centre. Outside these 
groups, there are many more researchers doing 
work that is in some way relevant to biotechnol- 
ogy. The Program Committee and the Ministry of 
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Fig. 4. Size of population of biotechnology-rclevanl researchers. 19x1 and 19X5. 
Economic Affairs have put forward an estimate of 
1500 to 2000 researchers in all. Thus, group sizes 
as in fig. 4 can bc calculated; an estimate for the 
situation in 1981 is based on the data in fig. 2. 
4. Findings at the ~ueso-level of iustitutions nnd 
agmcies 
As already noted in section 2, the Program 
Committee faced a system in which actors like 
policy bodies, funding agencies and research in- 
stitutions had already established their own do- 
mains and interests. Vertical lines predominate in 
this system (compare fig, 5), and there are clear 
blocks, often related to particular government 
ministries. An example is the National Council for 
Agricultural Research - formally a collaborative 
activity ol all actors involved in agricultural re- 
search - with advisory and coordination tasks. At 
the same time, it is the well entrenched “imple- 
mentation structure” [9] produced by the long- 
standing priority of rationalizing agriculture 
through research and advice, and concerned with 
defending this goal, as well as the jurisdiction over 
its domain. Another block (and, like the “green” 
block just mentioned. present in most Western 
industrialized countries) is connected with the goal 
of patronage for fundamental science: the re- 
search council system. funded by the Minister for 
Education and Sciences. In the Netherlands, the 
scientists themselves arc more strongly involved in 
the research councils than in most other countries, 
because they constitute standing panels to assess 
grant proposals and to discuss ongoing research in 
their own areas. 
When biotechnology became a priority, the ac- 
tors in the research system, as well as some of the 
government ministries involved, started to survey 
this area and develop policy lines. The Ministries 
of Economic Affairs, of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
and of Housing, Physical Planning and Environ- 
mental Affairs, had reports written, while the Na- 
tional Agricultural Research Council and the 
Central Organization of the Research Councils, as 
well as TNO, the big government supported 
Organization for Applied Research, established 
coordinating committees for biotechnology. The 
installation of the Program Committee Biotech- 
nology (by the Minister of Education and Sci- 
ences, in his capacity of Minister of Science Policy, 
and the Minister of Economic Affairs) introduced 
a new. and “horizontal”, actor into the system. 
The Ministries would now have to work through 
this committee, while the funding and policy 
bodies would have to defer to it, in so far as they 
would depend on it for funds and legitimation. 
The Program Committee identified two tasks 
(apart from the writing of the program and speci- 
fication of priorities): (1) forms and procedures to 
fund 
government 
ministries 
~01 icy bodies 
Fig. 5. Science policy bodies and rcseorch indtutions relevant IO the Progrum Comtni~kx Biokxhnology. wth lines ol reltitionships 
indicated. DGllW = Office for ffigher Education and Academic Rcsenruh: DGWH = Office of S&we Policy: 55 - Ministry of 
Economic Affairs: LIIW - Agricuiturd Univw4ty Wqgmingcn: L&V - Mmistry of hgriwlturc and Fidwricx; NRLO = Natiorml 
Council for Agricultur;tl Rcscarch: O&W = Ministry for f%iucation anlf %renccs; RIVM - St:ttc iw.litulc for Public Ifcdlh and 
Environmcnd ffygienc: RUG - State Univcrcity Groningcn: RUL m State Untvcrbity Leitlcn: STW - Foundarion for Technical 
Scicncc~; TtID - Technical Univwsiry Delfr: TN0 - Oryank~tion for Appliccl Rcwarch: UvA - University of Amstrrdam; VROM 
* Minrstry of [lousing. Physical Planning and f%virtmnrcntal Afl.lirs: VU = Frse Univcr~ity: ZWO = Central Org;lnkrtinn of the 
Rcaexch Councils. 
distribute the funds made availahlc for the stimu- 
lation of biotechnology had to be created. because 
existing institutions could not be relied upon to 
produce sufficient coordination by themselves; (2) 
allocation of funds and other activities had to fit 
into the policy framework that was being de- 
veloped, and relationships with other bodies 
(hierarchical, consu I tative or collaborative) had to 
be forged to ensure coordination at the policy 
Ievcl. Gradually, the first task was realized through 
the distinction between three categories of re- 
search discussed in section 2. and a close col- 
laboration between the Program Committee and 
the Evaluation Committee for Biotechnology of 
the Central Organization of the Research Coun- 
cils. The latter committee, partly because of its 
composition (including an industrialist as chair- 
man). identified strongly with the program and 
perspective developed by the Program Committee. 
and performed ali sorts of assessments of research 
proposals for the Program Committee. It became 
a central node in the newly created horizontal 
network, the “mail box” for everyone who wanted 
support. In contrast, the relationship with other 
bodies (Foundation for Technical Sciences, Coor- 
&nation Committee Biotechnology of the Na- 
tional Agricultural Research Council) was strained, 
and only evolved into some working relationship 
by the end of the period. 
Clearly, the second task was more difficuit than 
the first. The problems were exacerbated by an 
ambiguity in the approach of the Program Com- 
mittee itself. On the one hand, it saw itself as the 
overarching committee, that would deal with the 
government ministries, establish overall policy. and 
monitor its execution. (As such, it was indeed 
appreciated after a time: in the field, the Program 
Committee was seen as an effective ‘*product 
champion” for biotechnology, and as competent, 
both in biotechnology and in stimulating innova- 
tion.) On the other hand, it took upon itself to 
articulate and implement pohcies and priorities 
for industrial biotechnology, while more or less 
delegating agricultural and environmental biotech- 
nology to existing bodies. Thus, it acted on the 
same level as these bodies. instead of above them. 
The actual work of the Program Committee was 
therefore biased towards (big) industry - this ac- 
cusation was voiced a number of times - and 
relrttionships with other bodies remained ambigu- 
ous. At the end of the period, in May 1985. the 
Committee was dissolved. and the ambiguity was 
resolved by its being succeeded by two commit- 
tees: an overarching Advisory Committee Biotech- 
nology, and a special committee for industrial 
biotechnology. Most members of the Program 
Committee returned in one or the other of these 
two committees. 
There are further and important effects to be 
checked at the meso-level, namely for the research 
institutions. Although universities. and especially 
big research institutions like TNO. the Organiza- 
tion for Applied Research. may play a role at the 
policy level. their primary function is that of inter- 
mediary between policy and the actual perfor- 
mance of research. This was reflected in the inter- 
views. To trace an emerging “implementation 
structure” [9]. spokespeople were asked whose 
opinions and actions they would take into account 
when deciding upon a course of action. Spokes- 
people from funding and policy bodies referred to 
each other and to the Program Committee. while 
spokespeople from research institutions started 
with work relationships, peer groups and compcti- 
(ion with other research groups and other universi- 
ties. The Program Committee was only mentioned 
by those interviewees who were at the time actu- 
ally negotiating with the Committee about institu- 
tional grants. 
The impact of the Committee has been greater 
than suggested by interviewees, however, because 
the institutions and the interviewees use demarca- 
tions of biotechnology and priority areas desig- 
nated by the Program Committee when arguing 
for their own plans and comparing themselves 
with competitors. The program and priorities de- 
veloped by the Committee thus become, in effect, 
a forceful repertoire of legitimatory resources (even 
when they are used only rhetorically at first). The 
authority of the Committee derives not just from 
its being officially installed, but also depends on 
its being the main or exclusive source of material 
and legitimatory resources. This is reflected in the 
angry reaction of the Committee to the provision 
of special funds for biotechnology in the Univer- 
sity of Amsterdam, by the Minister for Education 
and Sciences. in the course of a general reshuffling 
of university budgets, and without referring to the 
Program Committee. The Committee could not 
get the decision reversed, but then argued that the 
university should submit their plans for these funds 
to the Committee for approval. This was (more or 
less) agreed. and the University of Amsterdam 
often quoted the program priorities when present- 
ing its plans for biotechnological research. 
In general, the Program Committee has been 
able to shape biotechnological activities in the 
research institutions according to its plans. often 
by some accommodation to developments in the 
field and interests of the institutions. When the 
Committee started its work in 1981, the aim was 
already to establish just three centres for biotech- 
nology: besides TNO. the Agricultural University 
Wageningen and the combination of the Technical 
University Delft and the University of Leiden 
were clear candidates having both technological 
and biological expertise and starting to integrate 
these disciplinary clusters. The third 
university-based centre was to be in the University 
of Groningen because of its tradition of applied 
microbiology and biochemistry. However, the 
combination of the University of Amsterdam and 
the Free University (located in Amsterdam) also 
claimed the status of a centre. a claim which was 
honoured in the Biotechnology Program drawn up 
in the spring of 1982. Each centre was to have (or 
maintain) a special focus, based on its expertise 
and on the wish of the Program Committee to 
partition the field systematically. For example, 
agricultural biotechnological research should now 
all be done in Wageningen. and conversely, other 
projects from this agricultural university. e.g. on 
biotechnological production of industrial chem- 
icals, would not be honoured. (This example has 
been a bone of contention, which is connected not 
only with general resistance of scientists to inter- 
ventions in their research decisions, but also with 
the overall transformations in bio-agricultural re- 
search. where the new approaches are being ex- 
plored outside the traditional institutions for 
agricultural research.) 
The designation of centres with specific focuses 
has speeded up the process of entrenchment of the 
biotechnology program in the research system. It 
provided a competitive advantage to research 
groups that were able to fit in with the priorities, 
and university boards, anxious to create an attrac- 
tive profile for their university, tended to stimu- 
late their biological and technological researchers 
in this direction. When the Program Committee 
started to make support available for the so-called 
Mtrltidisciplinaire d\t*arsoerbanden (see section 2) 
in the course of 1984, there were already definite 
plans from one centre, and some outlines of pro- 
posals in the other centres. At the same time. two 
modifications were introduced. One was the 
acceptance of a further centre. the University of 
Utrecht. with a focus on medical biotechnology. 
The Program Committee had neglected this area. 
while the University of Utrecht. in spite of its 
definite expertise and the support it received for 
its contract to develop vaccine preparation meth- 
ods for the Duphar company, had not bothered to 
present itself as a centre. When the Program Com- 
mittee organized a round of talks about the pro- 
gram and especially the Muhidisciplinuire dwars- 
oerbundm with all universities in the summer of 
1984, perceptions on both sides changed, and the 
University of Utrecht started a (successful) catch- 
ing up operation. 
The second modification derives from the gen- 
eral effort of the Program Committee to articulate 
its priorities and to make biotechnological re- 
search more responsive to industrial needs. To this 
end, interviews were held with eight major compa- 
nits on a strictly confidential basis, and the results 
were transformed into preferred themes of re- 
search, e.g. more work with yeasts and Hmillus. 
importance of enzyme technology and protein 
engineering. (At a later stage, also smaller firms 
were interviewed.) A new element was that the 
companies were also asked to identify good re- 
search teams in areas relevant to biotechnology. 
The Program Committee then published the list of 
preferred themes of research, and specified for 
each theme the core groups identified by industry. 
The universities and other research institutions 
only had to fill in the details, one could say. 
Effects of this step in the articulation of priori- 
ties can be traced in the program, as well as with 
the research institutions. New priorities were added 
to the program (e.g. protein engineering), while 
the research institutions generally followed the 
outlines given by the Program Committee. There 
was some grumbling by researchers about the 
(big) industry bias: “I refuse to become a branch 
of Gist-Brocades (a major biotechnology com- 
pany)“. Also, all institutions wanted to work on 
preferred themes (e.g. yeasts), in spite of the selec- 
tions set out by the Committee. Still, there is some 
ground in the view of the Committee that their 
approach to focus university research is a 
breakthrough. Because priorities are now linked to 
identifiable performers of research and concrete 
users, one may expect that horizontal relationships 
will evolve and become entrenched, i.e. continue 
without the active stimulation by a Program Com- 
mittee. 
From these findings. it appears that the definite 
shift to application-oriented research in the uni- 
versities discussed in the previous section is cou- 
pled with organizational and policy transforma- 
tions. including stronger links with industry and 
other users of biotechnological research. Respon- 
dents perceived the activities of the Program Com- 
mittee as one determinant of the shift in academic 
culture to a greater acceptance of applied research 
and links with industry. Concerns have been 
voiced. also in the Netherlands, about the dangers 
of this development for the position of university 
research and for the neglect of fundamental re- 
search in the area. Many respondents (as well as 
interviewees) shared this concern, but thought the 
problems manageable and/or not yet dangerous. 
An intriguing finding is that industrial respon- 
dents (and also respondents from government re- 
search institutions) thought the dangers greater 
than university respondents (only a quarter saw 
dangers). This may be connected with the typical 
industry perspective of a division of labour in 
research, where universities have the responsibility 
to do fundamental research. In the universities, on 
the other hand, the cornucopian vision of science 
and the possibilities for expansion are dominant 
considerations, while concerns about dangers may 
be repressed in order to follow the band-wagon. 
5. Implementation strategy and the dynamics of 
orientation of research to priorities 
Although the observed effects in biotechnol- 
ogy-related research in the Netherlands cannot 
always be attributed unambiguously to the activi- 
ties of the Program Committee, these certainly 
have had an impact, and the goals of the original 
priority would not, or not as rapidly, have been 
reached without them. This makes it relevant to 
assess the value of the strategy of implementation 
followed by the Committee: with a clear picture of 
what it wanted to achieve, they orchestrated its 
implementation while at the same time accom- 
modating to interests and obstacles in the research 
system. This might be a model for the middle 
course between dirigism and laissez-faire. Such an 
evaluation is bound up with a consideration of the 
dynamics of scientific research in a context of 
priority setting. 
In general. one should realize that government 
ministries often have no specific priorities for sci- 
ence. They commission particular research pro- 
jects relevant to their goals, and at times try to 
create programmatic coherence among them. 
Apart from that. ministries generally have a port- 
folio of themes and objects of research that they 
are interested in and willing to support if the 
occasion arises. The government ministry of sci- 
ence policy is a special case, because their portfolio 
of priorities is the main thing, and one of the 
justifications for its existence. In the Netherlands. 
the Office of Science Policy (of the Minister of 
Education and Sciences in his capacity of Minister 
of Science Policy) has created such a portfolio 
explicitly. Implementation of a priority, however, 
requires further articulation. which cannot be 
achieved without involvement of the relevant sci- 
entific and technological fields (and other relevant 
actors). In the Netherlands, special organizations, 
so-called sectoral councils, address the articulation 
of priorities and the formulation of research policy 
in broad areas of government concern on a con- 
tinuing basis. The device of a program committee, 
however, is more effective in particular cases, pro- 
vided it has sufficient autonomy to orchestrate the 
implementation. This follows from studies of im- 
plementation of policy in general, which em- 
phasize the importance of having a “fixer” to 
continually repair and add ,to the rules of the 
implementation game that has been set out by the 
government [2]. 
In the case of science policy, it is important 
that a program committee does not lack legitima- 
tion with regard to the scientific community. On 
the other hand, committee members should iden- 
tify sufficiently with the original priority to avoid 
large goal-shifts. Thus, the selection of committee 
members becomes a first step in the implementa- 
tion, and the major one as far as the original 
policy maker is concerned. In the case of the 
priority for biotechnology in the Netherlands. the 
search was for scientists of sufficient standing 
within their own community, prepared to take an 
activist approach, and interested in the application 
of biotechnology. The selection took a long time, 
also because important sectors and actors had to 
be represented. In fact, the committee was ex- 
panded after its original establishment in May 
1981, first with a member from Gist-Brocades (the 
major presence in Dutch industrial biotechnologi- 
cal research), later with a member representing the 
National Agricultural Research Council. The 
activism required by the necessity to “fix” the 
implementation game (in this case also in another 
sense: many of the rules had to be developed by 
the committee itself) was assured not only through 
the attitudes of the members (especially chairman 
and secretary). but also because the committee 
saw itself as a product champion for biotechnol- 
ogy. Many members belonged to the small core 
group of biotechnologists in the Netherlands that 
had founded the Dutch Biotechnological Associa- 
tion in 1978. and worked to create a professional 
identity for biotechnology. The global priority for 
biotechnology was in line with their own views, 
and left them enough room to specify themes and 
procedures as they saw fit. 
From the top down, the situation was set for 
successful implementation. From the bottom up, 
there was at first some reluctance. As discussed in 
section 3, many biologists had little experience 
with application-oriented research. nor a great wish 
to acquire it. At the first presentation of the plans 
of the Program Committee to the scientific and 
technological community (October 1981). con- 
cerns were voiced (also by the (bio)trchnologists) 
about the additional bureaucracy proposed. Four 
years later, many of those scientists and technolo- 
gists were working on priority areas and they. as 
well as their institutions, had adapted to the new 
organizational forms introduced in the research 
system. It is important to understand the dy- 
namics of such a shift, because implementors have 
to deal with it and modulate it in order to achieve 
their aims. 
Two points can be made on the basis of our 
study. The first derives from our finding that 
researchers themselves attribute major influence 
on research decisions during the last four years 
(the years during which the biotechnological com- 
ponent in their research increased, see fig. 2) to 
their institution and its policy. with their own 
research interests coming second. Activities of the 
Program Committee were considered to be least 
influential (of a list of eight possibilities). As fig. 6 
indicates, the rank order of perceived influences 
on past research decisions was different in differ- 
University Industry Govemmcnl 
(57%) (21%) (18%) 
I. Policy of own institurion 3 1 1 
2. Own research interest 1 3 3 10 2 
3. International science 2 4 2 to3 
4. Concrele enlemal questions 4 2 4 10 3 
Fig. 6. Rank order of factors perceived 10 influence research 
decisions in the period 1981-1984. for respondents from differ- 
ent types of institutions (percentages indicate fraction in sam- 
ple). Rankings for respondents from govemmcnl research in- 
scltutions cannel be aggregaled unequivocally. 
ent sectors, but in all cases there is a large gap 
between the four quoted factors and the other, 
more policy-related factors. The influence of policy 
is exerted indirectly, through the decisions of the 
research institutions (see fig. 7). Examples of the 
influence of the Program Committee on the in- 
stitutions have been quoted in the previous sec- 
tion. Their discussion indicated that influence 
could often only be achieved by some accommod- 
ation to the interests of these institutions. For 
implementation strategy, these findings and inter- 
prctations imply that making funds available for 
research projects in a certain arca will only create 
lines of research 
t 
own research / 
interests 
I 
commitments if funding is coupled with organiza- 
tional and policy changes in the research institu- 
tions 
The second point derives from an analysis of 
research decisions in terms of strategic action. 
Researchers take risks when they decide to invest 
in new projects. and evaluate benefits and risks in 
terms of their own skills and strategies. develop- 
ments in the field. actual and potential activities 
of competitors. and expectations about possible 
support and other resources. Decision making is 
also strategic for corporate actors like research 
institutions and funding bodies. although consid- 
erations will differ (e.g., institutional charter, pro- 
file, turf). The presence of a biotechnology pro- 
gram will shift the assessment of risks and be- 
nefits; its implementation may therefore be di- 
rected to judicious placing of funds and other 
resources. An immediate consequence of the stra- 
tegic perspective is that the promise of possible 
funds will often be a stronger incentive than the 
actual allocation of funds: once the money has 
been obtained, the efforts of the scientists will be 
gcarcd to the mobilization of new resources. 
Thcrc is a further implication: since access to 
concrete exrernal 
questions 
Fig. 7. Perceived influence on research decisions. 19X1-1984. 
the resources provided by a new policy program is 
not unrestricted - one has to do certain kinds of 
research, for instance, to qualify - it is not just the 
direct “costs” of the resources that determines the 
evaluations of the actors. The “market” of oppor- 
tunities for resources is an imperfect market - and 
since the actors know this. they act to secure a 
privileged position in the opportunity structure. 
(Terminology adapted from [lo].) This explains 
part of the band-wagon effect. For example, bio- 
technological research focusing on yeast has grad- 
ually become more important [18], and all biotech- 
nologists will be aware of the possibilities. When 
yeasts were to be one of the preferred themes in 
the further specification of the program (see sec- 
tion 4). more researchers than the Program Com- 
mittee had envisaged decided to invest in (pro- 
posals for) yeast research: they wanted to main- 
tain access to this part of the opportunity struc- 
ture. 
The same type of argument applies to the dcci- 
sions of biologists and technologists to become 
involved at all with biotechnology, or with the 
kind of biotechnology emphasized by the Program 
Committee. They see an opportunity structure in 
the making, and some actors already in a privi- 
Icgcd position (in our case. an example would be 
the three centres envisaged originally). At first, 
only sonic of the biologists and technologists that 
could make the switch (in terms of skills and 
institutional position) do so. But with each switch, 
the opportunity structure for biotechnology be- 
comes stronger, and the choice for the others more 
clear cut. At some point, a “critical mass” is 
reached, and the band-wagon starts to ride. Within 
a brief period, “everybody” would have started to 
do biotechnology - or have turned away defi- 
nitely. In terms of the picture shown in figs. 2 and 
4. there would not be a logistic growth curve of 
biotcchnologists and biotechnological components 
in research, but a slowly accelerating ascent, fol- 
lowed by a step function to almost the saturation 
level. As was argued in section 3. while some of 
these switches may start out as relabeling, they 
will become real if the opportunity structure is 
maintained long enough. 
To be effective, the implementor has to play on 
the dynamics of strategic decision making, has to 
orchestrate the band-wagon effect as it were. The 
Program Committee has done so, partly intui- 
tively, partly by trial, error and correction. and 
obviously helped on its way by the world-wide 
interest in and advances of biotechnology. it has 
also paid a lot of attention to the relations be- 
tween the different corporate actors and to the 
creation and stabilization of network linkages. 
which are other necessary aspects of successful 
implementation according to our analysis. Finally, 
the Prograrr Committee has sought publicity for 
biotechnotogy and for its program goals to an 
extent that is not always found in science policy. 
Even If this derives from its stance of “product 
champion” for biotechnology, the effect has been 
to create “credibility pressure”: researchers were 
forced to ask themselves why they were not part 
of the program, and if they did not raise the issue, 
it would be brought up by the board of their 
research institution. Obviously, publicity forms a 
dangerous tactic: it may backfire if it is perceived 
as just public relations. In fact, such reactions 
were heard, and it was respect for the competence 
of the committee members that saved them. (The 
other danger is that the committee will raise too 
high expectations about their efforts with policy 
makers and the public; again, a matter of finding 
the right balance.) 
These brief considerations of implementation 
strategies and the dynamics of orientation to policy 
priorities, informed by the experiences of the 
Dutch Program Committee Biotechnology, show 
that there is much more to the implementation of 
priorities than top-down programming or putting 
one’s hopes on proposal pressure. The middle 
course between these two extremes has been fol- 
lowed in practice in many cases already, and with 
effect, especially if the possibilities to exert lever- 
age were exploited. In this article we have shown 
that systematic evaluation and analysis of experi- 
ences leads to potentially generalizable insights, 
and thus allows transfer to other cases. 
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